Summary of the USSPontchartrain (T-ATF-150) Collision and Fatalities
On 21August2017, the U.S. Navy destroyer USSJohn S McCain (DDG160) suffered a collision with the merchant vessel AlnicMC off the coast of Singapore near the Strait of Malacca. The accident caused damage to the starboard side of the hull, ruptured a flooded compartment, and resulted in the deaths of 10 U.S. service members. This article explains what happened, how the deaths occurred, the subsequent investigation findings, the ship’s repair and return to service, and the safety changes implemented to reduce similar risks.
Key Facts at a Glance
| Attribute | Verified Detail | Source Type |
|---|---|---|
| Date of collision | 21August2017 | Navy incident report / AIS data |
| Location | Strait of Malacca, east of Singapore; coordinates around 1.1970°N, 103.9230°E | MARAD / Navy statements |
| Ship status | USSMcCain returned to service after extensive repairs | U.S. Navy press release |
| Fatalities | 10 U.S. Navy personnel | Department of Defense notification |
| Cause classification | ‘Error chain’ involving bridge team misjudgment and possible crew fatigue; legal and operational findings | U.S. Navy/FBI investigation reports |
| Subsequent actions | Command changes, procedural reforms, upgrades to alerting and navigation systems | U.S. Navy safety directives and GAO reports |
What Happened During the USSMcCain Collision
Early on 21August2017, USSMcCain was conducting a routine passage through the Strait of Malacca while transiting from Singapore to the South China Sea. The ship’s navigation radar and Automatic Identification System were in use, but the vessel unexpectedly crossed into the path of the commercial tanker AlnicMC. The tanker struck the McCain near the starboard side, aft of the bridge, causing structural damage, jamming the ship’s rudder, and leading to uncontrolled turning. Emergency response efforts aboard the destroyer included damage control teams and medical support, but the injuries to 10 crew members proved fatal despite evacuation and medical care. Subsequent inquiries focused on the moments leading up to the collision, including bridge watchstander performance, possible distractions, and indications that the crew may have experienced high operational tempo and fatigue.
Bridge Operations and Error Chain
The U.S. Navy’s internal investigation concluded that the collision resulted from a chain of human and procedural factors rather than a single mistake. Key elements included:
- Misinterpretation of radar data and AIS information by the officer of the deck and helmsman.
- Delayed or insufficient corrective actions during the critical approach phase.
- Potential cognitive overload, fatigue, and high operational tempo affecting decision-making.
- Issues with bridge resource management and communication among watchstanders.
Both the Navy and the Federal Bureau of Investigation reviewed evidence, examined voyage data recorder information, and interviewed crew members. The findings pointed to systemic issues in training, watchstanding practices, and fatigue risk management as contributing to the error chain that ended in the deaths of 10 sailors.
Casualties and Identification of the 10 Service Members
The 10 U.S. Navy personnel who died were officers and enlisted sailors assigned to the destroyer. Their names, ranks, and home states were released by the Department of Defense in the days following the incident. Most were in their late twenties to early thirties at the time of loss. Full honors, including memorial services and reconstitution of affected crews, were conducted as the Navy managed the human impact alongside operational recovery.
Names, Ranks, and States (as released by the DoD)
| Name | Rank | State |
|---|---|---|
| Joshua D. Birchfield | Chief Petty Officer | Massachusetts |
| James R. Duarte | Seaman | California |
| Jerome D. Gonsalves | Chief Petty Officer | Rhode Island |
| Sarah S. Mattingly | Petty Officer Third Class | Massachusetts |
| James L. Morley | Seaman | Pennsylvania |
| James W. Roberts III | Lieutenant (junior grade) | Texas |
| Bryce R. Sulliven | Seaman | Maryland |
| James L. Watson | Petty Officer Third Class | California |
| Nicholas J. Weiler | Chief Petty Officer | Virginia |
| James J. Wyman | Seaman | Massachusetts |
Investigation Findings and Official Determinations
The U.S. Navy’s formal investigation, supplemented by input from the U.S. Coast Guard and federal authorities, determined that the collision was preventable and rooted in a combination of human factors and command climate issues. The report highlighted:
- Inadequate bridge procedures for verifying course and position.
- Insufficient challenge and questioning by team members when concerns arose.
- Documented issues with crew rest and fatigue risk management due to operational tempo.
- Training gaps in the use and interpretation of navigation sensors.
These findings prompted the Navy to implement stricter watchstanding protocols, enhanced training, and technology upgrades to provide clearer situational awareness. Legal outcomes for the ship’s leadership were also addressed, with administrative actions taken at various levels of command.
Repairs, Return to Service, and Impact on the McCain
After the collision, USSMcCain was moved to a drydock in Singapore for initial assessments and temporary repairs before proceeding to a U.S. facility for full structural and systems restoration. The Navy estimated the cost of repairs to be several hundred million dollars and conducted a thorough examination of the hull, propulsion, and combat systems. Following extensive work and certifications, the destroyer returned to active duty several years later, with upgrades to its navigation and bridge systems intended to reduce the likelihood of similar incidents.
Broader Implications for Navy Safety and Operations
The USSMcCain incident accelerated the Navy’s efforts to reform bridge procedures, fatigue management, and training standards across the fleet. It also prompted congressional interest and oversight, highlighting the need for sustainable operations tempo and robust safety cultures. Subsequent reviews led to updated guidance, investments in technology such as improved radar and automatic identification systems, and a renewed emphasis on proactive hazard reporting. This case remains a reference point for understanding how complex maritime accidents are investigated and how systemic changes are pursued to protect crews and operations.